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CASE LAW
A. Court of Justice
Judicial protection against austeritymeasures in the euro area:Ledra and
Mallis
Joined Cases C-8/15 P to C-10/15 P, Ledra Advertising Ltd and Others v.
Commission and European Central Bank, judgment of the Court (Grand
Chamber) of 20 September 2016, EU:C:2016:701 and Joined Cases C-105/15
P to C-109/15 P, Konstantinos Mallis and Others v. Commission and
European Central Bank, judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 20
September 2016, EU:C:2016:702
1. Introduction
In its famous Les Verts judgment, the European Court of Justice described the
EU as “a Community based on the rule of law”, in which “neither its Member
States nor its institutions can avoid a review of the question whether the
measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic constitutional
charter, the Treaty”. The “system of legal remedies and procedures”
established by the Treaties for this purpose is “complete” and “natural and
legal persons are thus protected”.1 This understanding holds true when an
interference with the legal sphere of an individual can be traced back to a
Union legal act. It is, however, challenged when national measures
implementing content that was set at supranational level were adopted because
of non-legal reasons such as economic pressure on national legislators rather
than due to an EU legal obligation. This challenge turns into a problem, from
the perspective of judicial protection, if the economic pressure derives from
the need of a national legislature to receive financial assistance from external
sources in order to avoid a sovereign default. In such a situation, political
commitments to payment conditions set by the external creditors produce
effects similar to legal obligations. In avoiding sovereign default, national
legislatures implement such political commitments as if they were prescribed
by law. Whereas national courts can, when assessing measures implementing
1. Case 294/83, Les Verts v. Parliament, EU:C:1986:166, para 23.
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EU legal obligations, request a review of the legality of these obligations from
the ECJ, this possibility is precluded for measures implementing political
commitments defined at supranational level in non-legal documents. These
measures are purely national and to declare them void at national level would
not violate EU legal obligations. Yet, national courts find themselves in the
same position as the national legislature when initially adopting the measure
under review: declaring the national measure void would result in a
discontinuation of financial assistance, which might trigger a sovereign
default. The lack of the possibility to review the supranational raison d’être of
national measures implementing political commitments reveals the gap in
judicial protection when it comes to austerity measures in the euro area.
In short, austerity measures can be characterized as measures whose
substance is determined by a different actor than the one that is competent to
adopt them. The substance is set in non-legal instruments negotiated and
approved at supranational level. Compliance at national level is a precondition
for the payment of financial assistance, so non-compliance embodies the risk
of a sovereign default of the debtor country (the so-called “conditionality”2).
Austerity measures affect individuals in the form of national legal acts.
Judicial protection appears therefore to be available only for individuals at
national level, excluding legal review of the supranational raison d’être.
Indirect access to EU Courts, via the preliminary reference procedure, is
precluded since national austerity laws in the euro area do not implement EU
law. Direct access to EU Courts appears to be barred because of either a lack
of a reviewable act or of direct concern of acts of EU origin for individuals.
In this context, a group of depositors who lost part of their savings after a
“bail-in”3 that was politically requested by the euro area Member States in
Cyprus, brought direct actions at the General Court testing the limits of
judicial protection against austerity measures in the euro area at EU level. On
appeal against orders of the General Court dismissing the applications, the
ECJ confirmed limits on direct access for individuals seeking the annulment
of the European raison d’être of national austerity measures in the euro area
(Art. 263 TFEU). But it opened the doors for them to claim damages from the
Union for the violation of fundamental rights as guaranteed by the EU Charter
of Fundamental Rights by the European raison d’être, even if it was adopted
outside the EU legal framework and set down in a non-legal document (Arts.
268, 340(2) TFEU). Whilst the threshold for actually obtaining damages
2. Ioannidis, “EU financial assistance conditionality after ‘Two Pack’”, (2014) ZaöRV, 1;
Poulou, “Financial assistance conditionality and human rights protection: What is the role of the
EU Charter of fundamental rights?”, in this Review, 991–1026.
3. “Bail-in” refers to a measure rescuing a failing financial institution, which requires
creditors and depositors of the financial institution in distress to take a loss on their holdings.
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remains high and was not overcome in the present case, the fact that under
different factual circumstances the Union might be successfully held
financially liable for individual rights’ violations by austerity measures in the
euro area represents an important and unexpected step in filling the gaps in
judicial protection against these measures at EU level. The Commission must
now anticipate the risk of possible actions for damages when negotiating
financial assistance programmes with euro area Member States in financial
distress.
2. Background to the disputes
On 29 March 2013, a “bail-in” of estimated 7 bn Euro4 took place for Cyprus
in order to recapitalize the two major Cypriot banks. This “bail-in” affected
many depositors who lost part of their savings. The “bail-in” was based on two
decrees adopted by the central bank of Cyprus. The first one (decree No. 103)5
provided for a recapitalization of the Cypriot bank “Trapeza Kyprou Dimosia
Etaira Ltd” (“Bank of Cyprus”: BoC) through a conversion of deposits of
more than 100,000 euro into shares of the bank6 or into securities.7 The other
one (decree No. 104)8 ordered a transfer of certain assets and liabilities of the
“Cyprus Popular Bank Public Co. Ltd” (Laïki) to the BoC, including deposits
of up to 100,000 euro. Deposits of more than 100,000 euro remained with
Laïki, which was ultimately to be liquidated. The legal basis for both decrees
was the “Law on the resolution of credit and other institutions” of 22 March
2013.9
The “bail-in” was part of a political agreement reached between the
Republic of Cyprus, the Eurogroup, the Commission, the ECB and the IMF on
the future macroeconomic adjustment programme in return for financial
4. Michaelides, “Cyprus: From boom to ‘bail-in’”, 29 Economic Policy (2014), 639, at 641.
5. Regulatory Administrative Act No. 103, EE, Annex III (I), No. 4645, 769–80, 29 Mar.
2013.
6. 37.5% of the deposits concerned were converted into shares of the Bank of Cyprus.
7. 22.5% of the deposits concerned were converted into securities which were convertible
by the Bank of Cyprus into either shares or deposits; the remaining 40% of the deposits
concerned were converted into securities which were convertible into deposits by the central
bank of Cyprus.
8. Regulatory Administrative Act No. 104, EE, Annex III(I), No. 4645, 781–88, 29 Mar.
2013.
9. Resolution of Credit and Other Institutions Law (Basic Law) L17(Ι)/2013, 22 Mar. 2013.
This law was adopted by the Cypriot Parliament only a couple of days after it rejected a
legislative proposal introducing a one-off levy on all domestic bank deposits, which did not
provide for an exemption for deposits with a value below EUR 100,000.
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assistance,10 described in detail in an annex to the Eurogroup Statement of 25
March 2013. Negotiations leading to this agreement were initiated by request
of the Republic of Cyprus on 25 June 2012.11 The political agreement was
cast in legal form, the so-called “Memorandum of Understanding” (MoU),
with the formal approval of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which
is entrusted with the right to provide financial assistance to euro area Member
States. The approval was adopted by the ESM Board of Governors, which is
composed of the same persons as the Eurogroup, only on 24 April 2013 and
thereby almost one month after the actual “bail-in” took place. The MoU was
subsequently signed by the Commission, acting on behalf of the ESM, on 26
April 2013.
Adopting the law on the resolution of credit institutions before the formal
entry into force of the MoU was necessary because of the ECB’s
announcement of 21 March 2013 to stall the “Emergency Liquidity
Assistance” (ELA) provided by the Cypriot national central bank on 25 March
2013.12 Freezing ELA would have led to an uncontrolled bankruptcy of the
Cypriot banks as they would run out of liquid assets to meet clients’ demands.
ELA was at that time the only liquidity channel available for Cypriot banks
since they weren’t able to raise liquidity on private markets and the collateral
held by Cypriot banks in form of Cypriot government debt was no longer
accepted by the ECB in return for central bank liquidity.13 In such a situation,
national central banks may still issue liquidity against collateral of lower
quality than that accepted by the ECB, provided it does not interfere with the
objectives and tasks of the Eurosystem (Art. 14.4 ECB/ESCB Statute). The
higher risk exposure under ELA as compared to ECB liquidity channels is
10. Eurogroup Statement on Cyprus of 16 Mar. 2013. It should be noted that the agreement
reached on 16 Mar. did not exempt deposits below 100,000 euro either. This political agreement
was in breach of Art. 7(1a) of Directive 94/19/EC on deposit-guarantee schemes, as amended
by Directive 2009/14/EC, which elevated, by 31 Dec. 2010, the amount covered by national
deposit guarantee schemes up to 100,000 euro. In a statement of 18 Mar. the President of the
Eurogroup “reaffirms the importance of fully guaranteeing deposits below EUR 100,000”
requesting “more progressivity in the one-off levy compared to what was agreed on 16 March”.
Only after the rejection of the proposed one-off levy by the Cypriot Parliament, the Eurogroup
in its statement of 25 Mar. referred to a “safeguard [of] all deposits below EUR 100,000 in
accordance with EU principles”.
11. Cf. Statement of the Eurogroup on Cyprus of 27 June 2012, according to which the
Eurogroup “invite the Commission, in liaison with the ECB, and the Cypriot authorities and the
IMF to agree on a programme”.
12. ECB, Press release of 21 Mar. 2013.
13. This was due to a downgrade of Cyprus into speculative grade territory by all accepted
rating agencies, so that Cypriot government securities no longer fulfilled the creditworthiness
requirement for collateral in Section 6.3.2 of Annex I to Guideline ECB/2011/14 on monetary
policy instruments and procedures of the Eurosystem, O.J. 2011, L 331/1.
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legally tolerable due to the fact that failure of ELA, being a purely national
monetary policy measure, cannot entail liability of the Eurosystem.
This chain of events created a peculiar legal situation for those people that
lost part of their deposits because of the “bail-in”. Whereas the legal basis for
the “bail-in” was exclusively to be found in national law, the latter was only
enacted because of a political agreement with the Eurogroup, the
Commission, the ECB and the IMF, which was legally approved only after the
adoption of the abovementioned Cypriot legal acts.14 The sole document of
European origin referring to a “bail-in” that was published before their
adoption was the statement of the Eurogroup of 25 March 2013.
Against this background, assuming that the Cypriot legal acts ordering the
“bail-in” were only implementing measures of an agreement with Union
institutions, judicial protection at EU level against the “bail-in”, via direct
actions, appeared imaginable against two different measures: the Eurogroup
statement of 25 March, with the difficulty that these statements are not
considered to be acts producing legal effects, and the MoU, with the difficulty
that the latter was only adopted after the “bail-in” took place. Furthermore,
the goal of the applicants could be achieved either by an annulment of the
respective measure or by a successful claim for compensation against the
European Union equivalent to the diminution in value of the lost deposits.
Accordingly, two groups of depositors launched proceedings at the General
Court against the Eurogroup statement and against the MoU.
3. Orders of the General Court
The first group of depositors brought an action for annulment at the GC
against the Commission and the ECB in order to achieve the anulment of the
Eurogroup statement of 25 March 2013.15 Aware of the fact that the contested
14. In the form of the MoU of 24 Apr. 2013 and in the form of a Council Decision of 25
Apr. 2013 addressed to Cyprus on specific measures to restore financial stability and
sustainable growth, O.J. 2013, L 141/32, repealed by Council Implementing Decision
2013/463/EU of 13 Sept. 2013 on approving the macroeconomic adjustment programme for
Cyprus, O.J. 2013, L 250/40.
15. Case T-327/13, Mallis and Malli v. Commission and ECB, EU:T:2014:909; Case
T-328/13, Tameio Pronoias Prosopikou Trapezis Kyprou v. Commission and ECB,
EU:T:2014:906; Case T-329/13, Chatzithoma v. Commission and ECB, EU:T:2014:908; Case
T-330/13, Chatziioannou v. Commission and ECB, EU:T:2014:904 and Case T-331/13,
Nikolaou v. Commission and ECB, EU:T:2014:905. In the following, a reference to theMallis
case implies a reference to the entire group of cases, since the orders of the General Court only
differ with regard to amount of financial losses suffered by the respective applicant. See in
detail on these judgments Karatzia, “Cypriot depositors before the Court of Justice of the
European Union: Knocking on the wrong door?”, 26 King’s Law Journal (2015), 175–184.
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statement was not adopted by the Commission and the ECB, the applicants
argued that this act can nevertheless be imputed to both Union institutions.
The General Court rejected this argument. The Eurogroup – the actual author
of the statement – is an informal forum of discussion of the finance ministers
of the euro area Member States and not a decision-making body, and has not
received any delegations of power from the Commission or the ECB. The
Eurogroup is hence not under the control of the Commission or the ECB, nor
does it act as an agent of these institutions.16 In consideration of the identical
composition of the Eurogroup and the ESM Board of Governors, the GC
further dismissed an alternative interpretation, according to which the
statement could be imputed to the Commission and the ECB if it were to be
attributed to the ESM. Also in the context of the ESM, there were no powers
from the Commission or the ECB delegated to the ESM, nor had any of these
institutions the powers to interfere with the internal decision making of the
ESM.17
Furthermore, the GC did not consider the statement to be a reviewable act
under the action for annulment. According to its interpretation, the statement
was not intended to produce any legal effects but was of a purely informative
nature. The GC based its understanding on the fact that the Eurogroup is not
empowered to adopt any kind of legally binding measure. More specifically, in
its statement, the Eurogroup only “welcomed the plans for restructuring the
financial sector as specified in the annex”,18 and did not request the “bail-in”
as a pre-condition for financial assistance. Also, the power formally to
approve the financial assistance and the conditions attached to its payment
does not fall within the sphere of the Eurogroup, but within the competence of
the ESM Board of Governors.19 Based on these considerations, the GC
dismissed the application as inadmissible.
The second group of depositors based its action against the Commission
and the ECB on the MoU. They requested an annulment of those paragraphs in
the MoU referring to the restructuring and resolution of the BoC and Laïki20
and filed a claim for a compensation of the losses incurred because of the
“bail-in”.21 Like the applicants in Mallis, the applicants in Ledra faced the
obstacle of the authorship of the contested measure. Accordingly, the GC
16. Case T-327/13, Mallis, paras. 41 to 44.
17. Ibid., paras. 46 to 50.
18. Eurogroup Statement on Cyprus of 25 Mar. 2013, para 3.
19. Case T-327/13, Mallis, paras. 53 to 60.
20. These were paras. 1.23 to 1.27 of the MoU, published in: European Commission,
Occasional Papers 149, May 2013, 66–103, 74.
21. This concerns Case T-289/13, Ledra Advertising v. Commission and ECB,
EU:T:2014:981; Case T-291/13, Eleftheriou and Papachristofi v. Commission and ECB,
EU:T:2014:978 and Case T-293/13, Theophilou v. Commission and ECB, EU:T:2014:979. In
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dismissed the action for annulment by simply referring to fact that the parties
of the MoU, the Republic of Cyprus and the ESM, are not institutions
mentioned in Article 263(1) TFEU.22
Regarding the claim for compensation, the GC discussed two possible
forms of conduct leading to the damages suffered by the applicants. The first
was the adoption of the MoU reiterating the restructuring and the resolution of
BoC and Laïki. The second was the failure of the Commission to fulfil its role
as guardian of the Treaties under Article 17(1) TEU when signing the MoU.
With regard to the adoption of the MoU, the GC rejected the imputability of
the MoU to the Commission or the ECB; the signature of the MoU by the
Commission was, according to Article 13(4) of the ESM Treaty, only on
behalf of the ESM. The MoU solely commits the ESM, but not the EU.23 As
regards the failure of the Commission to ensure that the MoU is in conformity
with EU law, the GC refrained from discussing the allegation in substance but
denied the existence of a causal link between this conduct and the damage
suffered. The GC based its reasoning on the fact that the MoU was signed by
the Commission on 26April 2013, whereas the decrees by the Cypriot national
central bank that ordered the “bail-in” entered into force on 29 March 2013,
and thus before the signature of the MoU.24 It hence concluded by dismissing
the claims.
4. Opinions of theAdvocates General
The claimants lodged appeals against the GC orders with the Court of Justice.
The grounds of appeal revolve around the following legal problems: first, with
regard to the actions for annulment, whether a Eurogroup statement and an
MoU are reviewable acts under Article 263(1) TFEU, which can, second, be
imputed to the Commission and the ECB as recognized defending parties in an
action for annulment. Related to this, applying the principle of falsa
demonstratio non nocet, whether, third, the Eurogroup instead of the
Commission or the ECB could be considered a defending party in such
proceedings. With regard to the action for damages, fourth, it remained
debatable whether the Commission’s signature of the MoU can be seen as
unlawful conduct giving rise to damages and whether, fifth, there is a causal
the following, a reference to Ledra implies a reference to the entire group of cases since the
orders of the General Court only differ with regard to amount of financial losses suffered by the
respective applicant.
22. Case T-289/13, Ledra, para 58.
23. Ibid., paras. 44 to 47.
24. Ibid., paras. 48 to 54.
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link between such unlawful conduct and the damages sustained due to the
“bail-in”.
The Advocate General’s Opinion in Mallis dealt with the first three legal
problems.25 Remarkably, the Advocate General did not stay within the narrow
borders of the subject-matter of the case, because of the “the importance of the
questions which those appeals raise from the point of view of effective
judicial protection”,26 but elaborated more fundamentally on crucial issues in
relation to judicial protection against austerity measures in the euro area at EU
level. Regarding the actual appeals, he came to the conclusion that they must
be dismissed, as the Eurogroup statement of 25 March 2013 produced no
binding legal effects with respect to third parties27 and could, moreover, not be
imputed to the Commission or the ECB.28 Although he wondered whether the
GC should have declared the application inadmissible because it was directed
against the Commission and the ECB although it concerned a Eurogroup
statement,29 he based his reasoning on the same arguments as the GC.
Going beyond the subject of the appeals, the Advocate General took a
closer look at alternative ways to obtain judicial protection against austerity
measures than those used by the applicants in Mallis. This concerned the
possibility to include the Eurogroup in the list of parties in Article 263(1)
TFEU and the reviewability of paragraphs of an MoU, of Council decisions
reiterating the content of an MoU, or of macroeconomic adjustment
programmes reflecting the MoU under Regulation 472/2013.30 Regarding the
Eurogroup, the Opinion, first of all, dismissed an understanding of the
Eurogroup as being a Council configuration: the Eurogroup is not mentioned
in the list of Council configuration.31 The existing links between the
Eurogroup and the Council, in the form of the office of the President of
the Eurogroup Working Group at the General Secretariat of the Council and
the fact that the Eurogroup meets on the eve of meetings of the Economic and
Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN), are not sufficient to overcome the
25. Opinion of A.G. Wathelet in Joined Cases C-105-109/15 P,Mallis, EU:C:2016:294.
26. Ibid., para 53.
27. Ibid., para 132.
28. Ibid., para 117.
29. Ibid., para 109.
30. Regulation 472/2013 of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary
surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious
difficulties with respect to their financial stability, O.J. 2013, L 140/1.
31. Decision of the Council (General Affairs) No. 2009/878/EU of 1 Dec. 2009
establishing the list of Council configurations in addition to those referred to in the second and
third subparagraphs of Art. 16(6) TEU, O.J. 2009, L 315/46, amended by European Council
Decision No. 2010/594/EU of 16 Sept. 2010 amending the list of Council configurations, O.J.
2010, L 263/12.
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different functions assigned to the Eurogroup, on the one hand, and to the
Council, on the other. Whilst the latter exercises, together with the European
Parliament, legislative functions, the former is a mere forum, in which
“questions related to the specific responsibilities [the euro area Member
States] share with regard to the single currency” are discussed.32 Not being a
Council configuration does not exclude a classification of the Eurogroup as a
body, office or agency in terms of Article 263(1) TFEU. Such a classification
would, however, conflict with the fact that the Eurogroup has no legal
personality. According to the Advocate General, if acts adopted by bodies
without legal personality are to be subject to an action for annulment, the
Treaty has named these bodies, such as the European Council or the
Committee of Regions, explicitly.33 The limitations set by the wording of
Article 263(1) TFEU could, from the perspective of effective judicial
protection, be overcome if the Eurogroup could adopt legally binding
decisions. Since the Treaties do not provide for such a competence, the
Eurogroup cannot implicitly be included in the list of parties under Article
263(1) TFEU.
Regarding the content of austerity measures in general, there are three
possible acts that could form the subject-matter of a legal review: the MoU
itself, which was the choice of the applicants in Ledra, the Council Decision
reiterating the content of the MoU, and the macroeconomic adjustment
programme under Article 7 of Regulation 472/2013. An MoU is not a legally
binding instrument.34 National measures adopted on the basis of an MoU do
not constitute an implementation of EU law, although an MoU must,
according to Article 13(3) of the ESM Treaty, be fully consistent with Union
law.35 An MoU is against this background not a reviewable act under Article
263(1) TFEU. Council decisions reiterating the content of an MoU form a
reviewable act for an action for annulment. But they are not capable of being
of direct concern to individuals initiating an action for annulment against such
Council decisions.36 The same reasoning applies to macroeconomic
adjustment programmes adopted under Regulation 472/2013.37 In order to
close this gap in judicial protection against austerity measures in the euro area,
the Advocate General considers a primary legal obligation for Member States
“required by the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU to provide
32. Art. 1 of Protocol No. 14.
33. Opinion in Mallis, para 64.
34. Ibid., para 87.
35. Ibid., para 84.
36. Ibid., paras. 89–90 referring to the GC Orders in Case T-541/10, ADEDY and Others v.
Council, EU:T:2012:626, para 87 and Case T-215/11, ADEDY and Others v. Council,
EU:T:2012:627, para 99.
37. Opinion in Mallis, para 98.
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‘remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection’enabling the courts of
the Member State to refer to the Court of Justice questions for a preliminary
ruling on the validity of those decisions and, consequently, the validity of the
macroeconomic adjustment programme at issue.”38
In Ledra, the concise Opinion focused on the issue under appeal.39
Regarding the action for annulment of the MoU, the Advocate General
rejected the jurisdiction of the ECJ. The MoU is an act decided by the ESM,
which is extraneous to the EU legal order.40 In relation to the action for
damages, the Advocate General did not find any unlawful conduct on the part
of the Commission which could give rise to damages. In doing so, he analysed
two different acts that could form the basis for the unlawful conduct: one was
the signature of the MoU by the Commission;41 the other was the failure of the
Commission to ensure that the MoU does not violate EU law.42 With regard to
the former, the Advocate General agreed with the GC’s reasoning that, by
signing on behalf of the ESM, the MoU cannot be imputed to the
Commission. It may therefore remain open whether the contested paragraphs
of the MoU violated individual rights under EU law; a violation could in any
event not be attributed to Union institutions. With regard to the failure of the
Commission to fulfil its role as “Guardian of the Treaties”, the Advocate
General denied the existence of a legal obligation underArticle 17TEU for the
Commission “to act against any possible breach of EU law”.43 The Opinion
distinguishes between a breach of EU law and the task of the Commission to
ensure and to oversee the application of the Treaties under Article 17(1) TEU.
The presence of the first does not imply an infringement of the latter in case of
inaction. In order to arrive at this conclusion, the Advocate General relied on
the legal regime of the infringement action under Articles 258 to 260 TFEU.
Initiating proceedings against Member States that breach EU law lies within
the discretionary powers of the Commission. Individuals have no legal claim
to request the Commission to act against Member States. Failure to bring an
infringement action against a Member State that violated EU law does not
amount to unlawful conduct of the Commission and hence does not result in a
successful claim for compensation against the Union.44 This reasoning should
be applied a fortiori to the Commission’s general obligation to act as
“Guardian of the Treaties”. Against this background, the question of whether
38. Ibid., paras. 91 and 98.
39. Opinion of A.G. Wahl in Joined Cases C-8-10/15 P, Ledra, EU:C:2016:290.
40. Ibid., para 127.
41. Ibid., paras. 49 to 59.
42. Ibid., paras. 61 to 107.
43. Ibid., para 76.
44. Ibid., para 78 referring to Case 247/87, Star Fruit v.Commission, EU:C:1989:58, paras.
10 to 14 and Case C-87/89, Sonito and Others v. Commission, EU:C:1990:213, paras. 6 and 7.
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a “bail-in” violates EU law could remain unanswered since, even if there had
been a violation, the failure of the Commission to act under Article 17(1) TEU
does not amount to an unlawful conduct under Article 340(2) TFEU
triggering the non-contractual liability of the Union.45
Only in the alternative, the Advocate General turned to the substantive
question whether the contested paragraphs of the MoU violate the Charter of
the Fundamental Rights. His answer is in the negative, since he already denies
the applicability of the Charter. Whereas the Commission is fully bound by the
Charter, it only applies, according to Article 51(1), to Member States “when
they are implementing Union law”. The MoU, being an act of the ESM, does
not implement Union law since the ESM was established by a subset of
Member States exercising their national competences.46 Requiring the
Commission to apply the Charter when acting on behalf of the ESM and, thus,
acting outside the competences conferred upon it by Union law, would extend
“the applicability of the Charter into a field of law which is not meant to be
regulated by that instrument”.47
Anticipating possible criticism of his solution, the Advocate General
clarifies that his understanding of Article 17 TEU does not imply that the
ESM acts in a “legal vacuum”.48 By referring to Draft Articles on the
responsibility of international organizations49 he assigns the responsibility for
violations of EU law by an MoU to the ESM and to the Member States that
established the ESM.50 Judicial protection should therefore be sought by
citizens before the competent national courts.
5. Judgments of the Court
The Grand Chamber of the ECJ dismissed both appeals. It rejected the appeal
with regard to the action for annulment of the Eurogroup statement inMallis
and of the MoU in Ledra in a very concise manner. As regards the action for
damages, the Court approved, in the first instance, the argument of the
appellants that the Commission’s inaction to prevent a violation of the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights could constitute unlawful conduct leading to a
non-contractual liability of the Union. The appeal was, however, not
successful, because the alleged violation of Article 17 of the Charter was
45. Ibid., para 80.
46. Ibid., para 88 referring to Case C-370/12, Pringle, EU:C:2012:756, paras. 178 to 181.
47. Ibid., para 90.
48. Ibid., para 93.
49. Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2011, vol. II, Part Two.
50. Opinion in Ledra, paras. 98 to 103.
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justified in order to ensure the stability of the banking system of the euro area
as a whole, which thus rendered the Commission’s conduct lawful, thereby
ruling out the Union’s non-contractual liability.
InMallis,51 the Court agreed with the GC and the Advocate General that the
Eurogroup statement cannot be imputed to the Commission and the ECB,
repeating their line of argument: the statement is of a purely informative
nature52 and the role of the Commission and of the ECB in the Eurogroup does
not go beyond mere participation in its meetings.53 Moreover, taking into
account the identical composition of the Eurogroup and of the ESM Board of
Governors, the role accorded to both Union institutions by the ESM Treaty is
not broader than that in the Eurogroup. Their duties under the ESM Treaty do
not entail the exercise of any power to take decisions on their own, and their
activities only commit the ESM alone.54 The same reasoning was applied by
the Court in the Ledra case to the question whether, for the purpose of an
action for annulment, an MoU concluded by the ESM could be imputed to the
Commission and the ECB.55
In remarkable contrast to the GC and the Advocate General, the Court
found in relation to the action for damages that a violation of Charter rights by
an MoU can trigger the non-contractual liability of the Union under Article
340(2) TFEU. The conduct forming the basis for the non-contractual liability
of the Union is the failure by the Commission to “oversee the application of
Union law” as required by Article 17(1) TEU.56 The obligation enshrined in
the Commission’s role as guardian of the Treaties in the context of the ESM is
to “refrain from signing a memorandum of understanding whose consistency
with EU law it doubts”.57 The fact that the power to sign an MoU is a task
allocated to the Commission by the ESM Treaty, which is an international law
instrument outside the EU legal order, does not alter the character of the legal
obligations imposed by the EU Treaties on the EU institutions.58 This conduct
– the failure to “oversee the application of Union law” – amounts to unlawful
conduct if there is a “sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to
confer rights on individuals”.59 Such rule of law can be found in individual
rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights (such as Art. 17 of the
51. Judgment in Mallis.
52. Ibid., para 59.
53. Ibid., para 57.
54. Ibid., para 53.
55. Judgment in Ledra, paras. 52 to 54.
56. Ibid., para 57.
57. Ibid., para 59.
58. Ibid., para 56.
59. Ibid., paras. 64 and 65.
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Charter in Ledra).60 Therefore, whenever there is a violation of an individual
Charter right by a draft MoU, the failure by the Commission to prevent this
violation from coming into existence constitutes unlawful conduct, which
gives rise to damages under Article 340(2) TFEU provided that there is causal
link between this conduct and the damage. The fact that Member States do not
implement Union law in the context of the ESM and are therefore not bound
by the Charter according to its Article 51(1) does not release Union
institutions from their Charter obligations even when acting within the ESM
framework.61
When assessing whether the “bail-in” of Cypriot depositors amounts to a
violation of Article 17 of the Charter, the Court concluded that such a
“bail-in” is a proportionate measure to ensure the “stability of the banking
system of the euro area as a whole”, which does not violate the Charter.62 The
appeals on admissibility in the Ledra case were therefore upheld, but the
actions for damages were dismissed by the Court. Since the actions were
dismissed on the ground of the lawfulness of the Commission’s conduct, the
Court no longer needed to rule on the issue of the causal link between the
unlawful conduct and the damages, which was of importance for the initial
order of the GC.
6. Comments
With its judgment in Ledra, the ECJ reduced the fragmentation of judicial
protection against austerity measures in the euro area despite a legal
framework that, to put it mildly, made it at least difficult for EU Courts to
establish their jurisdiction. The protection gap is, however, not yet completely
filled, as will be shown below. Before entering into a detailed discussion of the
Court’s judgments (section 6.4), it seems necessary to outline the legal
framework of austerity measures in the euro area (6.1), the complexity of
which makes the correct identification of the reviewable act and the legally
accountable author for the purposes of achieving judicial protection against
austerity measures in the euro area a difficult task (6.2). Afterwards a brief
overview over the state of judicial protection against these measures at
national level including the possibility to refer preliminary questions to the
60. Ibid., para 66. Art. 17 of the Charter states: “Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose
of and bequeath his or her lawfully acquired possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her
possessions, except in the public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for
by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for their loss. The use of property
may be regulated by law in so far as is necessary for the general interest.”
61. Ibid., para 67.
62. Ibid., paras. 71–74.
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Court (6.3) reveals the judicial protection gap that can only be closed by direct
actions before the ECJ (6.4).
6.1. The legal framework of austerity measures in the euro area
The legal framework of austerity measures in the euro area evolved over three
generations in relation to the rescue packages that were set up for Greece I
(May 2010), Ireland (November 2010), Portugal (May 2011), Greece II (July
2011), Spain (July 2012), Cyprus (May 2013) and Greece III (August 2015).
The first generation (dealing with Greece I) was formed by a set of two
intergovernmental agreements establishing the “Greek Loan Facility” (GLF),
which pooled bilateral loans from euro area countries to Greece and which
was managed by the Commission.63 The second generation (dealing with
Ireland, Portugal and Greece II) consisted of Council Regulation 407/2010
establishing a European financial stabilization mechanism (EFSM),64 being a
Union instrument managed by the Commission and financed by the EU
budget, and of the intergovernmental EFSF Framework Agreement setting up
the “European Financial Stability Facility” (EFSF),65 being a “special purpose
vehicle” under private law funded by the euro area Member States.66 The third
generation (dealing with Spain, Cyprus and Greece III) was created with the
entry into force of the intergovernmental Treaty establishing the European
Stability Mechanism (ESM).67
Although the legal framework consists of numerous legal acts stemming
from within and outside the EU legal order, the basic construction of the legal
framework remained the same. A Member State in financial distress receives
financial assistance in return for the promise of policy reforms and the
subsequent implementation of this promise in national legislation.68 The
63. The Greek Loan Facility consisted of the Intercreditor Agreement between the euro
area countries (other than Greece) of 8 May 2010 and the Loan Facility Agreement between the
euro area countries (other than Greece and Germany) and the KfW (Kreditanstalt für
Wiederaufbau, on behalf of Germany) as lenders, and Greece as borrower and the Bank of
Greece as agent of the borrower of 8 May 2010 (attached as schedules 1 and 2 to the Irish Euro
Area Loan Facility Act 2010 (2010 No. 7)).
64. Council Regulation 407/2010 establishing a European financial stabilization
mechanism, O.J. 2010, L 118/1.
65. European Financial Stability Facility Framework Agreement of 7 June 2010.
66. The EFSF was established as a Société Anonyme under Luxembourg law.
67. Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism between the euro area Member
States of 2 Feb. 2012 entering into force on 27 Sept. 2012.
68. Recital 6 of the Preamble and Arts. 4(1) and 4(2) of the GLF intercreditor agreement,
Recitals 6 and 7 of the GLF loan facility agreement (first generation); Art. 3(1) of Regulation
407/2010 (EFSM) and Recital 2 and Art. 2(1)(a) of the EFSF Framework Agreement (second
generation); Arts. 3 and 12(1) of the ESM Treaty (third generation).
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content of the policy reforms is negotiated between the Member State’s
government and the so-called “troika” consisting of the Commission, the ECB
and the IMF69 and set out in a “memorandum of understanding” (MoU)70
approved by representatives of the lenders.71 The MoU embodies the
unilateral declaration of intent of the Member State to adopt certain policy
measures and the unilateral declaration of intent of the future creditor(s) to
provide for financial assistance. The latter declaration approves the content
of the former, and the disbursement of financial assistance is subject to the
condition that policy reforms promised in the first declaration are
implemented. Non-compliance is sanctioned by non-payment. The
effectiveness of this compliance mechanism is hence based on the threat of
sovereign default as a consequence of the non-payment of financial
assistance. The recipient Member State follows up on its promises declared in
the MoU by adopting national laws in accordance with national legislative
procedures. Only then and only in the form of national laws do policy reforms
agreed upon in an MoU affect individuals.
This basic construction is supplemented by Union acts: Council decisions,
based on either Articles 126 and 136 TFEU (with a view to EFSF or ESM
programmes)72 or on Article 3(2) of Regulation 407/2010 (with a view to
EFSM programmes),73 reiterating parts of the content of an MoU and
“macroeconomic adjustment programmes” (adopted by the Council),74 based
69. Art. 2(1) of the GLF intercreditor agreement (first generation); Art. 3(1) of Regulation
407/2010 (EFSM) and Art. 2(1)(a) of the EFSF Framework Agreement (second generation);
Art. 13(3) of the ESM Treaty (third generation).
70. Recital 6 of the Preamble and Art. 4(1) of the GLF intercreditor agreement, Recital 6 of
the GLF loan facility agreement (first generation); Art. 3(1) of Regulation 407/2010 (EFSM)
(here called: “economic and financial adjustment programme”) and Recital 2 and Art. 2(1)(a)
of the EFSF Framework Agreement (provided that there is no MoU approved by all euro area
Member States (other than the recipient one) under Regulation 407/2010 covering also EFSF
assistance) (second generation); Art. 13(3) of the ESM Treaty (third generation).
71. Art. 2(1) of the GLF intercreditor agreement (approval by the parties) (first generation);
Arts. 3(2), (3)(c) and (4)(c) of Regulation 407/2010 (EFSM) (approval by the Council) and Art.
2(1)(a) of the EFSF Framework Agreement (approval by the Eurogroup Working Group)
(second generation); Arts. 5(6)(f) and 13(4) of the ESM Treaty (approval by the ESM Board of
Governors).
72. Greece I: Council Decision 2010/320/EU, O.J. 2010, L 145/6 (based on Arts. 126(9)
and 136 TFEU); Greece II: Council Decision 2011/734/EU, O.J. 2011, L 296/38 (based on Arts.
126(9) and 136 TFEU); Spain: Council Decision 2012/443/EU, O.J. 2012, L 202/17 (based on
Arts. 126(6) and 136 TFEU); Cyprus: Council Decision 2013/236/EU, O.J. 2013, L 141/32
(based on Arts. 126(6) and 136 TFEU).
73. Ireland: Council Implementing Decision 2011/77/EU, O.J. 2011, L 30/34; Portugal:
Council Implementing Decision 2011/344/EU, O.J. 2011, L 159/88; Greece III: Council
Implementing Decision 2015/1181/EU, O.J. 2015, L 192/15.
74. Ireland: Council Implementing Decision 2013/373/EU, O.J. 2013, L 191/10; Portugal:
Council Implementing Decision 2013/375/EU, O.J. 2013, L 192/74; Cyprus: Council
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on Article 7 of Regulation 472/2013,75 which are supposed to set a benchmark
for the content of MoU as the Commission has to ensure the consistency of
MoU with these programmes.76 These Union acts co-exist with the MoU and
partly overlap in content. They are, however, legally not synchronized with
each other. Modifications of the one have to be reproduced with regard to the
other in accordance with the respective procedures.
Stepping back from the actual legal framework and looking only at its
mechanics, one can draw a comparison with the mechanics of an EU directive
under Article 288(3) TFEU. Just like directives, austerity measures affect
individuals only in the form of national implementing measure. Like
directives, the result to be achieved by austerity measures is set at
supranational level. The only difference between the two is that compliance is
ensured with regard to directives by legal internationalization based on the
implementation obligation enshrined in Articles 288(3) TFEU and 4(3) TEU,
and with regard to austerity measures by conditionality and the threat of
sovereign default in case of non-compliance.77
6.2. Complexity of the legal framework of austerity and judicial
protection: Identifying the reviewable act and the legally accountable
author
Obtaining effective judicial protection requires the identification of the
correct reviewable act and an action before the competent court against the
legally accountable author of the identified act. Whilst this is, in principle, a
matter of course in legal proceedings, in which the reviewable act is the one
addressed to the affected individual and the legally accountable author is the
authority adopting this act, the correct identification of both and, linked to
that, of the competent court turns into a major challenge in relation to austerity
measures against the background of the complex legal framework described
above. Possible acts could be the national measure implementing the MoU, the
MoU itself or Council decisions reiterating the content of an MoU. Possible
authors can be the national legislature, the ESM/EFSF, the Commission, the
Implementing Decision 2013/463/EU, O.J. 2013, L 250/40; Greece III: Council Implementing
Decision 2015/1411/EU, O.J. 2015, L 219/12.
75. Regulation 472/2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of
Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect
to their financial stability, O.J. 2013, L 140/1.
76. Art. 7(2)(2) of Regulation 472/2013, ibid.
77. For a detailed commentary on the various compliance mechanisms in EU economic
governance, see Amtenbrink and Repasi, “Compliance and enforcement in economic policy
coordination in EMU”, in Jakab and Kochenov (Eds.), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values
(OUP, 2017), p. 165 et seq.
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ECB, the Council and the Eurogroup. Possible courts can be national and EU
courts. An action before national courts may, in principle, be available against
national measures adopted by the national legislature, but identifying the
reviewable act and the legally accountable author for an action before EU
courts is much more difficult. The obvious choice is Council decisions
reiterating MoUs, being Union acts, with the Council, being a Union
institution, as the author; but this suffers from ambiguity with regard to its
legal impact on the MoU embodying the conditionality for financial
assistance. If judgments concerning these Council decisions have no impact
on MoUs, bringing an action against these decisions won’t fill the detected
gap in judicial protection. In the alternative, bringing an action against the
MoU, as the core document containing the policy targets for the recipient
Member State, meets the problem that this document does not intend to
produce any legal effects, and this is required in order to be challengeable act
under Article 263(1) TFEU. Besides, turning to the choice of the legally
accountable author, the ESM/EFSF, representing the creditors approving the
content of the MoUs, are authors of an MoU but located outside the EU legal
framework. Though located inside the EU legal framework, the Commission
and the ECB are not the explicit authors of an MoU. The Eurogroup, finally,
representing the same people that decide on behalf of the ESM/EFSF, is not
considered a legally accountable author because of its lack of decision-making
powers and of any formal structure.
This brief tour of possible options for claimants reveals that, at the level of
EU courts, effective judicial protection requires either a legally established
spillover of legal consequences concerning Council decisions to MoUs, so
that Council decisions may constitute an appropriate reviewable act for an
action for annulment,78 or the MoU has to be drawn into the EU legal
framework by imputing it to the Commission, the ECB79 or the Eurogroup. In
the latter case, the Eurogroup would have to be included implicitly in the list
of legally accountable authors in Articles 263(1), 267(1)(b) and 340(2)
TFEU.80 Finally, the Commission, being a Union institution legally
accountable before EU Courts, could, when exercising powers conferred upon
it outside the EU legal framework, still trigger the non-contractual liability of
the Union under Article 340(2) TFEU, since the establishment of unlawful
conduct on the part of the Union institution does not require the presence of a
reviewable act, so an action for damages could be admissible.81
78. This issue is addressed in section 6.4.2. infra.
79. This issue is addressed in section 6.4.3. infra.
80. This issue is addressed in section 6.4.1. infra.
81. This issue is addressed in section 6.4.4. infra.
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6.3. Judicial protection against austerity measures through direct actions
at national courts
In principle, austerity measures affect individuals in the form of national law
implementing MoUs. Individuals could therefore seek judicial protection at
national courts reviewing austerity measures against national constitutions.
This path was taken by several claimants in Portugal, Cyprus and Greece.
Some of these actions were successful; for instance, the Portuguese
Constitutional Court struck down a 10 per cent cut of former public workers’
pensions,82 and the Greek Council of State declared the privatization of the
water supply of the cities of Athens and Thessaloniki void.83 In other cases,
however, the national courts were conscious, when assessing the
constitutionality of a national measure, of the risk of sovereign default as a
consequence of the “conditionality mechanism” described above. Most
prominently, the Portuguese Constitutional Court considered in its ruling on
the suspension of bonuses for public employees in 2012 that “the
consequences of an unqualified declaration of unconstitutionality could
endanger the maintenance of the agreed financing and thus the State’s
solvency”.84 Also the Greek Council of State, apparently under the impression
of the imminent danger of sovereign default, justified benefit cuts promised
by the Greek State in the first MoU by referring to the overriding requirement
of consolidating public finances.85
Against this background it becomes apparent that effective judicial
protection against austerity measures in the euro area must not only consider
national measures that actually affect individuals, but also the supranational
raison d’être of these measures. The comparison with the EU directive is
revealing in this respect. If the content of the national measure was imposed
by EU directives, national courts would reject legal review by simply referring
to the EU legal obligation of the Member State to implement directives under
Articles 288(3) TFEU and 4(3) TEU. They would furthermore consider
referring a preliminary question on the validity of the EU directive to the ECJ,
which ensures the rule of law at EU level. In the context of austerity measures,
82. Ruling No. 862/2013. More details on the Portuguese Constitutional Court cases in
relation to austerity measures can be found in Canotilho, Violante and Lanceiro, “Austerity
measures under judicial scrutiny: The Portuguese constitutional case-law”, 11 EuConst
(2015), 155.
83. Decision of the Council of State No. 1906/2014.
84. Ruling No. 352/2012, English summary, available at: <www.tribunalconstitucional.pt/
tc/en/acordaos/20120353s.html> (last visited 22 June 2017).
85. Decision of the Council of State No. 668/2012.
CML Rev. 20171140 Case law
there is an MoU instead of an EU directive.86 Failure to qualify the latter an
EU act precludes a validity check by the ECJ.
It should be noted that the fact that an MoU is not intended to produce legal
effects does not render a preliminary reference under Article 267(1)(b) TFEU
inadmissible. In contrast to the notion of the challengeable act under Article
263(1) TFEU, in order to be a matter of upon which a preliminary ruling can
be requested, an act does not, by definition, have to have a binding effect.87
Yet, the act must at least participate in the legal consequences of another EU
act producing legal effects. A harmonized technical standard, for example,
which is a non-binding measure set by a private standardization body, is
subject to the Court’s jurisdiction under the preliminary reference procedure
because a provision of an EU legal act refers to this standard. Article 4(2) of
Directive 89/106/EEC88 confers on products, which satisfy the technical
requirements defined in the harmonized technical standards, the benefit of a
presumption of conformity with the basic requirements of that directive
allowing the CE marking to be affixed to them.89 A norm of EU law hence
draws a measure having no legally binding effect into the EU legal framework
and, by that, into the ECJ’s jurisdiction under Article 267(1) TFEU. This
explains why an MoU concluded by Romania in order to receive balance of
payments assistance from the EU’s Balance of Payments Facility (BoPF)
could be subject of a preliminary reference.90 The MoU implementsArticle 3a
of Regulation 332/2002 establishing a facility providing medium-term
financial assistance for non-euro area Member States,91 as foreseen in Article
143 TFEU. The legal consequences defined by the Regulation make the MoU
a part of the EU legal framework and, by that, subject to preliminary questions.
In contrast to this, MoUs concluded in order to receive financial assistance
for euro area Member States have, as described above (section 6.1), no
comparable link with the EU legal framework and can therefore not be
considered EU acts. As such, MoUs concluded by euro area Member States
cannot be part of preliminary reference proceedings, although the case law of
the ECJ does not require an act to be intended to produce legal effects in order
to be a valid subject-matter. This also seems to be the reason why the Court
86. The effectiveness of a legal review of the supplementary Union acts is assessed in
section 6.4.2. infra.
87. Case C-613/14, James Elliott Construction, EU:C:2016:821, para 35; Case C-188/91,
Deutsche Shell, EU:C:1993:24, para 18; Case C-322/88, Grimaldi, EU:C:1989:646, para 8.
88. Council Directive 89/106/EEC on the approximation of laws, regulations and
administrative provisions of the Member States relating to construction products, O.J. 1989, L
40/12.
89. Case C-613/14, James Elliott Construction, para 38.
90. Case C-258/14, Florescu, EU:C:2017:448, paras. 34 et seq.
91. O.J. 2002, L 53/1.
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rejected its jurisdiction to answer preliminary questions involving national
measures implementing MoUs.92 Although these questions concerned the
interpretation of provisions of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the
Court’s reasoning, according to which the Portuguese Budget Law
implementing the MoU does not seek to implement EU law, can be applied to
the determination of the Court’s jurisdiction to answer a question on the
validity of an MoU. The MoU is not an act that connects the EU legal order
with the national legal order. This finding is not put into question by the
Court’s case law on the broad interpretation of the scope of application of
the Charter with regard to national measures.93 Although Article 51(1) of the
Charter is now to be understood to already bind Member States when acting
“within the scope of application of EU law”, there is still the necessity for an
EU “triggering rule”.94 The MoU is not such a “triggering rule” of EU
origin.95
In view of this, judicial protection against austerity measures in the euro
area at national level appears to be fragmentary, as their supranational raison
d’être cannot be legally reviewed. The pressure to comply with an MoU
exerted by the conditionality mechanism that sanctions non-compliance with
the discontinuation of financial assistance to States in distress does not only
touch national legislatures when adopting national implementing measures,
but also national courts when reviewing these measures. Without the
possibility to achieve a judicial invalidation of the supranational raison d’être,
national courts appear to be inclined to shrink away from declaring national
austerity measures void.
6.4. Judicial protection against austerity measures through direct actions
at EU courts
The fragmentary judicial protection against austerity measures through
national courts prompts claimants to bring direct actions at EU Courts. The
ECJ’s judgments in Mallis and Ledra opened the Court’s gates for direct
actions against austerity measures and specified at the same time the
92. Case C-128/12, Sindicato dos Bancários do Norte, EU:C:2013:149, paras. 10–12; Case
C-264/12, Sindicato Nacional dos Profissionais de Seguros e Afins, EU:C:2014:2036, paras.
18–20; Case C-665/13, Sindicato Nacional dos Profissionais de Seguros e Afins,
EU:C:2014:2327, paras. 13–15.
93. Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, EU:C:2013:105. See generally, Poulou, op. cit.
supra note 2.
94. Sarmiento, “Who’s afraid of the Charter? The Court of Justice, national courts and the
new framework of fundamental rights protection in Europe”, 50 CML Rev. (2013), 1267, at
1279.
95. Ibid., at 1286.
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conditions for bringing such actions. Before going into details, it is important
to clarify which issues the Court ruled on and which issues remain unsettled.
The ECJ ruled on the nature of Eurogroup statements without classifying
whether the Eurogroup could be considered a valid defending party in an
action before it.96 The Court did not discuss direct actions in relation to
“supplementing Union acts” such as Council decisions reiterating austerity
measures set by an MoU. In the context of the action for annulment, the Court
ruled on criteria to determine whether a measure can be attributed to other
Union institutions than the issuing body and declined to impute Eurogroup
statements or MoUs to the Commission or the ECB. As for the action for
damages, the Court set criteria under which a failure by the Commission to
adopt a measure can lead to an unlawful conduct on its part, triggering the
non-contractual liability of the Union. The Court concluded that a “bail-in”,
even if it is only mentioned in an MoU, can violate the Charter, but that it is
justified in the case at hand. The question of the causal link between an MoU
concluded after the enactment of a national austerity measure remained open,
as the existence of unlawful conduct by the Commission was dismissed by the
Court because the “bail-in” was justified. In the following, the emphasis will
be placed on the Eurogroup as a defending party of direct actions (6.4.1), on
the MoU as a reviewable act and the prospects of success of direct actions
against supplementing Union acts (6.4.2), on the attribution of measures
adopted by other bodies to Union institutions in the context of the action for
annulment (6.4.3), and on the impact of measures adopted by other bodies on
the establishment of unlawful conduct on the part of Union institutions in the
context of the action for damages (6.4.4). Since the focus of these comments
is on judicial protection against austerity measures in the euro area, the
question whether a “bail-in” is a violation of Article 17(1) of the Charter and
its justification by the Court will not be addressed in the following.97
6.4.1. The Eurogroup as defending party of direct actions
The claimants in Mallis brought their actions against a statement of the
Eurogroup, as this was the only document published before the adoption of
the contested “bail-in”. Although the actions were directed against the
96. This derives from the fact that in Mallis, at para 61, the Court only addresses the
annulment of a Eurogroup statement and refuses to equate the Eurogroup with a Council
configuration or to classify it as body, office or agency. The Court does not, however, make a
statement on the application of the Les Verts case law to the Eurogroup, as can be seen from the
reference to paras. 55–65 of the Opinion of A.G. Wathelet, thus excluding para 66, in which the
A.G. mentioned this possibility to teleologically extend Art. 263(1) TFEU to the Eurogroup.
97. See on this question e.g. Artemou, “Rights of European Union depositors under Article
17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights after the Cyprus bail-out”, 28 Pace International Law
Review (2016), 205.
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Commission and the ECB, prior to discussing whether a Eurogroup statement
can be imputed to Union institutions, the questions should have been
addressed whether the Eurogroup could be considered a defending party in
direct actions. The GC referred in this regard to the issue of the “mistaken
designation” of a defendant by the applicants.98
The Eurogroup is not mentioned amongst the parties in Article 263(1)
TFEU. It can also not be considered a “body, office or agency of the Union”.
The common denominator of these is the presence of legal personality
established by an EU act and its inclusion in the institutional and
administrative structure of the EU, as reflected in the EU budget.99 The
Eurogroup has no legal personality. Article 137 TFEU and Protocol No. 14
create a forum of exchange of the finance ministers of the euro area Member
States. If an actor has no legal personality, in order to be a defending party of
direct actions, Article 263(1) TFEU explicitly mentions it, such as e.g. the
European Council. Therefore, the Eurogroup can only be considered a party
under Article 263(1) TFEU if it meets the criteria of the famous Les Verts
judgment. According to this case law, an entity can be a valid defending party
although it is not mentioned in Article 263(1) TFEU if it is “capable of taking
decisions affecting individuals”.100 The rationale underlying this judgment is
the fundamental principle of the rule of law “inasmuch as neither [EU]
Member States nor [EU] institutions can avoid a review of the question
whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic
constitutional charter, the Treaty”.101
Again, a look at the wording of Article 137 TFEU and Protocol No. 14
appears to suggest that the Eurogroup cannot adopt decisions intended to
produce legal effects. Neither confer any explicit competences on the
Eurogroup. The absence of legal effects is in particular true with a view to
the contested Eurogroup statement, which used language giving rise to the
impression that it only took note of political developments that happened in
Cyprus, without having exerted any kind of influence on them itself. The
Eurogroup statement has the appearance of being “purely informative”. Based
on this assessment, the conclusion that the Eurogroup is not a defending party
under Article 263(1) TFEU since the Eurogroup statement is not a legal act
affecting third parties is certainly valid if not compelling.
98. Case T-327/13, Mallis, para 36.
99. Opinion of A.G. Jääskinen in Case C-562/12, Liivimaa Lihaveis, EU:C:2014:155,
para 35.
100. Case 294/83, Les Verts, paras. 23 and 24; Opinion of A.G. Jääskinen in Case C-439/13
P, Elitaliana v. Eulex Kosovo, EU:C:2014:2416, para 51. In Case T-117/08, Italy v. EESC,
EU:T:2011:131, paras. 32 et seq. The GC recognizes the EESC as a valid defending party by
reference to this reasoning.
101. Case 294/83, Les Verts, para 23.
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Yet, a different understanding appears to be arguable, according to which
the Eurogroup is more than an informal meeting, when taking the other fora
into account that bring together the same people composing the Eurogroup:
the ESM Board of Governors (Art. 5(1) and (2) ESM Treaty) and the ECOFIN
Council when taking decisions mentioned in Article 139(4) TFEU or on the
basis of Article 136 TFEU or of secondary law, which was adopted in
conjunction with Article 136 TFEU (such as the “two pack” regulations). In
the latter case, the finance ministers of all EU Member States are allowed to be
present during the deliberations, but only those from the euro area Member
States have the right to vote.102 A statement of the Eurogroup “of a purely
informative nature” foreshadows, against this background, subsequent
decisions adopted by the ESM (and hence outside the EU legal framework) or
the Council (but maybe only “approving” national measures after their
enactment), in particular when the terminology used by the statement
corresponds to that of the subsequent decisions. This “foreshadowing effect”
could form the basis for an argument according to which legally binding
decisions adopted by another forum of the members of the Eurogroup can be
attributed to the Eurogroup. In line with the Les Verts judgment the Eurogroup
can then be considered a defending party in an action for annulment. The
reference to the Les Verts case law implies that a number of conditions have to
be fulfilled in order to reach this conclusion: there has to be a lacuna in the
system of judicial protection against measures of European origin that cannot
be bridged other than by an extensive interpretation of Article 263 TFEU. The
Les Verts case law is built on the assumption that the system of legal remedies
and procedures in the Treaty is complete, albeit special conditions of
admissibility limiting the direct access to the Court for natural and legal
persons. If therefore a lacuna in judicial protection can be closed by obtaining
a preliminary ruling on the validity of the contested measure of European
origin, via national judicial proceedings, direct access to EU courts remains
restricted. The above-mentioned orders of the Court rendering preliminary
references from Portuguese courts in the context of austerity measures
inadmissible prove, however, in principle, the presence of a lacuna in the EU
system of legal remedies and procedures which must be filled by opening the
doors to direct actions.103
102. It should be noted that the Eurogroup meets usually “on the eve of the Economic and
Financial Affairs Council meeting”, see <www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/euro
group> (last visited 22 June 2017); this carries the risk of advanced deliberations in the
Eurogroup and subsequent voting in the ECOFIN Council without in-depth discussions.
103. Kilpatrick, “On the Rule of Law and economic emergency: The degradation of basic
legal values in Europe’s bailouts”, 35 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2015), 1, at 24–26,
shedding light on this rule of law challenge.
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Although this argument could lead to an admissible direct action against the
Eurogroup, it would not change the outcome of the Court’s decision inMallis.
Not only was this action not directed against the Eurogroup (but the
Commission and the ECB), it was also limited to the Eurogroup statement
without further reference to any decision with a legally binding effect. To
reinterpret the action from one directed against the Commission and the ECB
aiming at annulling a Eurogroup statement as one directed against the
Eurogroup aiming at annulling corresponding paragraphs in the Eurogroup
statement, the MoU concluded between Cyprus and the ESM, Council
Decision 2013/236 and Council Implementing Decision 2013/436, would
certainly transgress the limits of the “mistaken designation”, as it would
amount to an entire new action.104
6.4.2. The MoU as reviewable act and the prospects of success of direct
actions against supplementing Union acts
In contrast to the Mallis case, focusing on the Eurogroup statement, Ledra
revolves around the MoU. In passing, the GC105 and the Advocate General106
deal with the quality of an MoU as a reviewable act. Whilst legal scholarship
discusses the legal status of MoU as legally binding107 or not,108 the GC and
the Advocate General simply refer to the parties of the MoU being located
outside the EU legal framework, whereby EU courts have no jurisdiction to
review MoUs.The arguments classifying an MoU an act which is not intended
to produce legal effects and which is concluded between parties outside the
EU legal framework are ultimately more convincing. The choice of an MoU,
being an instrument that traditionally does not produce legal effects, in order
to lay down the conditions for financial assistance instead of an international
legal agreement is a deliberate one made by the parties.As described in section
6.1, the MoU embodies the unilateral declaration of intent of a Member State
to adopt certain policy measures, and the unilateral declaration of intent of the
104. A.G. Wathelet in his Opinion inMallis, paras. 108 to 115, viewed this reinterpretation
by the GC as crossing these limits.
105. Case T-289/13, Ledra, paras. 56 to 58.
106. Opinion in Ledra, paras. 123 to 129.
107. Fischer-Lescano,Human Rights in Times of Austerity Policy (Nomos, 2014), pp. 32 to
37, referring to Klabber, The Concept of Treaty in International Law (Kluwer Law
International, 1996), p. 42; Cisotta and Gallo, “The Portuguese Constitutional Court case law
on austerity measures:A reappraisal”, in Kilpatrick and De Witte (Eds.), Social Rights in Times
of Crisis in the Euro Area: The Role of Fundamental Rights’ Challenges, EUI Working Papers
2014/05, 85, 88; Kilpatrick, “Are bailouts immune to EU social challenge because they are not
EU law?”, 10 EuConst (2014), 393, 412.
108. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 3rd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2013),
pp. 48–50; Greek Council of State, Ruling No. 668/2012, para 27 and Ruling No. 2307/2014,
para 19.
CML Rev. 20171146 Case law
future creditor(s) to provide for financial assistance. Non-compliance with the
promise made by the Member State in financial distress is sanctioned by
non-payment. Creditors have, however, no legal claim to compliance. At the
same time, debtors have no legal claim to request payment in the event of a
successful implementation of the promised policy reforms. The legal basis for
disbursement is not to be found in the MoU, but in the legal act establishing the
creditors’ institution, which provides for a stand-alone decision of the
governing bodies on the disbursement of each tranche of financial
assistance.109
This understanding of the MoU brings the Council decisions reiterating the
content of MoUs into focus.110 These decisions are reviewable acts under
Article 263(1) TFEU and the Council as their author is legally accountable for
these decisions. Direct actions against such Council decisions brought by
individuals require, however, that the contested decisions, being addressed to
Member States, are of individual and direct concern to the claimants in order
to render the action admissible. Because of the “wide discretion” left to the
national authorities as to how they implement policy reforms referred to in
these decisions, the GC already ruled that these decisions are not of direct
concern to individuals.111 This requirement of “direct concern” does not need
to be met for the admissibility of preliminary references, which also explains
why Advocate General Wathelet suggests precisely this path for obtaining
effective judicial protection against austerity measures in the euro area.112
Yet, the prospect of success of this path depends on whether there is a legal
spillover of Court judgments concerning Council decisions to MoUs. Only if
the substance of an MoU has to be modified as a consequence of a Court
decision in a preliminary reference procedure on Council decisions reiterating
this substance, can effective judicial protection against austerity measures in
the euro area be achieved by way of preliminary rulings on these Council
decisions. Assuming such legal spillovers appears, however, rather doubtful.
The legal framework as described in section 6.1 clearly shows that
conditionality is attached to the MoU and not to the Council decisions
reiterating the MoU.
109. With regard to the ESM: Arts. 13(5), 15(5), 16(5) and 17(5) of the ESM Treaty.
110. Opinion in Mallis, para 134; Kilpatrick, “On the Rule of Law and economic
emergency: The degradation of basic legal values in Europe’s bailouts”, 35 Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies (2015), 1, 18; Kilpatrick, op.cit. supra note 107, 409–413; Tuori and Tuori, The
Euro Area Crisis (Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 237–238; Costamagna, “Saving
Europe ‘under strict conditionality’: A threat for EU social dimension?”, Centro Einaudi,
Working Paper LPF No. 7 (2012), 14; Poulou, “Austerity and European Social Rights”, 15
German Law Journal (2014), 1145, 1160.
111. Case T-541/10, ADEDY, paras. 84, 87; Case T-215/11, ADEDY, paras. 97, 99.
112. Opinion inMallis, paras. 91, 98.
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The disbursement of financial assistance from the ESM is therefore only
conditional upon compliance with the MoU and not with the Council decision
reiterating the MoU. Article 7 of Regulation 472/2013 does not link the
“macroeconomic adjustment programmes”, which are adopted by these
Council decisions, to the disbursement of financial assistance. Declaring parts
of these Council decisions void would hence not affect conditionality. This
could only be seen differently if the MoU has to be adapted to the operative
part of a judgment of the ECJ on Council decisions reiterating the MoU. The
provisions of the ESM Treaty governing the MoUs do not, however, provide
for such an adaptation obligation. Article 13(3)(2) of the ESM Treaty states
that the “MoU shall be fully consistent with the measures of economic policy
coordination” under EU law. There must hence be an alignment between the
MoU and the “macroeconomic adjustment programmes”, being measures of
economic policy coordination, before the formal adoption of an MoU.
Furthermore, one can conclude from the power of the Commission to sign the
MoU on behalf of the ESM in Article 13(4) of the ESM Treaty that there is the
duty on the part of the Commission to check the draft MoU’s compliance with
EU law, including “macroeconomic adjustment programmes”, before
signature.113 Yet, there is no provision in the ESM Treaty, which would
empower Union institutions to modify an already existing MoU in accordance
with any changes made to “macroeconomic adjustment programmes” or any
other Council decision reiterating the content of the MoU, including a
possible partial annulment by the ECJ.114 Against this background, judicial
protection against Council decisions reiterating the content of MoUs appears
not to be sufficient in order to bridge the detected gap in judicial protection
against austerity measures in the euro area. Council decisions and MoUs
co-exist next to each other without a legal obligation to adapt the latter to the
former after the MoU entered into force.
6.4.3. The attribution of measures adopted by other bodies to Union
institutions in the context of the action for annulment
The core issue addressed by the two judgments is the attribution of measures
adopted by other bodies (such as the Eurogroup in Mallis or the ESM in
Ledra) to Union institutions. The ECJ stated in this regard that a measure
formally adopted by another body is to be imputed to Union institutions if it is
the “expression of a decision-making power” of those institutions.115
Applying this reasoning to the Eurogroup statement, the Court examined first
113. Ibid., para 82.
114. Kilpatrick, op.cit. supra note 107, 403 comes to a different conclusion referring to the
EEOP 147, p. 15; that is, however, not a legal text.
115. Judgment inMallis, para 57.
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whether the Commission and the ECB possess own decision-making rights
within the Eurogroup or within other fora composed of the same people as the
Eurogroup, such as the ESM, and secondly whether the Eurogroup or other
fora composed of the same people have received delegated powers from the
Commission or the ECB or act under the supervision of these institutions.
Within none of them do the Commission or the ECB exercise own powers to
make decisions, and none of them has received any powers from these
institutions. The Eurogroup has, according to Article 137 TFEU and Protocol
No. 14 no competences to take decisions and the decision-making powers of
the ESM were conferred on it by the Contracting Parties. The exercise of the
ESM powers is not supervised by Union institutions, so acts adopted by
exercising these powers cannot be imputed to the Commission or the ECB.
This assessment is in line with GC’s case law on imputing measures adopted
by Union agencies to the Commission.116 Consequently, the action for
annulment of measures adopted by other bodies than the Union institutions
against which the action was directed has to be considered inadmissible.
6.4.4. Impact of measures adopted by other bodies on triggering the
non-contractual liability of the Union
The doors to the action for annulment in the context of austerity measures
appear to be closed for affected individuals either because measures adopted
outside the EU legal framework cannot be imputed to Union institutions, or
because a reviewable act is not of direct concern to the individual bringing
such action. These obstacles are, however, less relevant when individuals
bring an action for damages under Articles 268, 340(2) TFEU. The interest
pursued by the individual is then not aimed at nullifying an act but at a
compensation for damages, whilst the act remains valid. Instead of proving
that a reviewable act is of individual and direct concern, the individual must
then only assert having sustained damages due to unlawful conduct on the part
of Union institutions.117 In order to establish the non-contractual liability of
the Union, a four-step test must be carried out.118 First, a breach of a rule of EU
law intended to confer rights on individuals has to be identified. Second,
Union institutions must have contributed, through action or inaction, to this
breach in a sufficiently serious manner. Third, there must be actual and certain
damage. Fourth, a direct causal link between the damage and the sufficiently
116. Case T-133/03, Schering-Plough v. Commission and EMEA, EU:T:2007:365, paras.
22–23; Case T-439/08, Kalliope Agapiou Joséphidès v. Commission and EACEA,
EU:T:2010:442, para 34.
117. Gutman, “The evolution of the action for damages against the European Union and its
place in the system of judicial protection”, 48 CML Rev. (2011), 695, 710 et seq.
118. Case C-352/98 P, Bergaderm and Groupil v. Commission, EU:C:2000:361, para 42.
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serious breach must be established in a sense that the damage is not to be found
to be too remote from the unlawful conduct on the part of the Union
institutions and that the violation can be imputed to the Union institutions’
action or inaction. It should be noted that non-contractual liability of the
Union for lawful acts or conduct is excluded by the case law of the ECJ,119 with
the notable exception of claims for compensation because of unjustified
enrichment on the part of the Union,120 which cannot be considered a
“liability for damages” in the strict sense.121
A sensible evaluation of the Court’s judgment in Ledra requires to identify
at the very outset the issues the Court was addressing and those that were not
mentioned by it in its findings. Conclusions with regard to future cases can
only be drawn from issues that the Court dealt with in its judgment. Since the
action was dismissed, although the appeals were upheld, the Court did not have
to discuss all conditions necessary for a successful claim for compensation but
only those leading to the dismissal.Amongst the requirements for establishing
the non-contractual liability of the Union, the Court dealt with the rule of EU
law which is intended to confer rights on individuals, the breach of this rule,
the margin of manoeuvre in indicating the presence of a sufficiently serious
breach in the context of the adoption of an MoU and the imputability element
of the causal link between the unlawful conduct on the part of the Commission
and the alleged damage.
The individual right that was allegedly breached by the Commission in
Ledra was the right to property, as enshrined in Article 17(1) of the Charter,
which binds the Commission as a Union institution without any reservations
according to Article 51(1) of the Charter. Although the “bail-in”, as requested
from Cyprus in the MoU, falls within the scope of Article 17(1) of the Charter,
the Court rejected a breach of the right to property because a “bail-in” can be
justified as a proportionate measure in order to ensure the stability of the
banking system of the euro area as a whole. These two points represent
the first step in assessing the Union’s non-contractual liability under Article
340(2) TFEU. No further discussion would have been necessary in the
proceedings in the Ledra case. Yet, since the GC dismissed the action not
because there was no breach of EU law but because the contested paragraphs
119. Joined Cases C-120 & 121/06 P, FIAMM et al. v. Council and Commission,
EU:C:2008:476, paras. 167–179.
120. In this case the applicant has merely to show that there is an enrichment on the part of
Union institutions, for which there is no valid legal basis, and an impoverishment on the part of
the applicant which is linked to that enrichment, cf. Case C-47/07 P, Masdar v. Commission,
EU:C:2008:726, paras. 47–50.
121. The Court accepted the admissibility of an action under Arts. 340(2) and 268 TFEU
because of the non-contractual nature of the claim in order to avoid a gap in effective judicial
protection at EU level (ibid., para 50).
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on the “bail-in” in the MoU could not be imputed to the Commission, the
Court was forced, on appeal, to turn to the question of imputability although
this is an element of the causality test, which constitutes the last step in
establishing the non-contractual liability of the Union.
Crucial for establishing whether a breach of an individual right can be
imputed to a Union institution is the precise identification of the conduct that
is found to have contributed to the breach. The GC considered the adoption of
the MoU to constitute this conduct. The Court, however, referred to the
Commission’s inaction in overseeing the application of Union law (Art. 17(1)
TEU) and in ensuring that MoU are consistent with EU law (Art. 13(3) and (4)
ESM Treaty). For the Court, it is the Commission’s inaction in the context of
the adoption of the MoU that constitutes the conduct to examine when
deciding on the imputability of the breach. The Court’s view appears to be the
more convincing solution. When identifying the conduct that contributed to an
alleged violation of EU law, one has to take all those steps in a chain of events
into consideration that, if the acting institution had decided differently, would
beyond any reasonable doubt have prevented the alleged breach from
materializing. This includes the formal adoption of the MoU, which cannot be
imputed to the Commission, but it also includes the signature of the MoU,
which can only be done by the Commission according to Article 13(4) of the
ESM Treaty, and the negotiations of the content of an MoU, which are led by
the Commission “in liaison with the ECB and, wherever possible, together
with the IMF” (Art. 13(3) ESM Treaty). Signing an MoU and negotiating it
even though the Commission doubts the consistency of parts of the MoU with
EU law form a stand-alone contribution of the Commission to an alleged
breach of EU law by these parts of the MoU once the latter is formally
adopted. It is therefore convincing to attribute an alleged breach of EU law by
an MoU to the Commission for the purpose of establishing the
non-contractual liability of the Union. The fact that the MoU is an act located
outside the EU legal framework does not change this finding since, with
reference toPringle, “the tasks conferred on the Commission and the ECB [by
the ESM Treaty] do not alter the essential character of the powers conferred on
those institutions by the EU and FEU Treaties”.122
Two elements amongst the requirements in order to establish the
non-contractual liability of the Union for breaches of fundamental rights by
austerity measures still have to be addressed: the sufficiently serious manner
in which the Commission contributed to the alleged breach and the direct
causal link between the damage and the unlawful conduct, inasmuch as the
damage could be found to be too remote from the conduct. Crucial for
122. Case C-370/12, Pringle, para 162.
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establishing a sufficiently serious breach of an individual right is the
determination of the margin of manoeuvre a Union institution has at its
disposal when acting within the scope of the allegedly violated individual
right. If this margin is considerably reduced, or even correlates to a duty to act,
the mere infringement of EU law may suffice to establish the existence of a
sufficiently serious breach of that right.123 If a Union institution has discretion
when acting, there is only an unlawful conduct on the part of this institution if
it “manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits on its discretion”.124 When
defining the limits of the margin of manoeuvre a Union institution has at its
disposal, the field, the circumstances and the context in which that duty was
imposed on the EU institution or body concerned, as well as the complexity of
the situations to be regulated, must be taken into account.125
In its judgment in Ledra, the ECJ only implicitly addresses the issue of a
sufficiently serious breach and the Commission’s margin of manoeuvre in the
field of negotiating and adopting an MoU, as it was not necessary for the
dismissal of the actions (because there was no breach). Yet, the Court
stresses the obligation of the Commission to ensure that MoU are consistent
with EU law126 “in the context of the adoption of the Memorandum of
Understanding”.127 This reasoning in the judgment should be seen against the
Opinion of the Advocate General; the latter rejected a sufficiently serious
breach because of the Commission’s broad discretion. In Ledra, the
determination of the margin of manoeuvre of the Commission depended on
the interpretation of Article 17(1) TEU and the Commission’s role as
“guardian of the Treaties” when acting within the scope of Charter rights in
the context of the adoption of MoUs. In interpreting Article 17(1) TEU, the
ECJ differs from the Opinion of its Advocate General with far-reaching
consequences.
The Court identified in Article 17(1) TEU a duty for the Commission “to
refrain from signing a memorandum of understanding whose consistency
with EU law it doubts”,128 whereas the Advocate General considered that the
Commission has “no obligation as to the result to avert any possible conflict or
tension between provisions of an act adopted by other entities and any EU
123. Case C-337/15 P, European Ombudsman v. Staelen, EU:C:2017:256, para 39; Case
C-440/07 P, Commission v. Schneider Electric, EU:C:2010:324, para 160; Case C-282/05 P,
Holcim v. Commission, EU:C:2007:226, para 47.
124. Case C-352/98 P, Bergaderm, para 43.
125. Case C-337/15 P, Staelen, para 40; Case C-440/07 P, Schneider Electric, para 161;
Case C-282/05 P, Holcim, para 50; Joined Cases C-363 & 364/88, Finsider and Others v.
Commission, EU:C:1992:44, para 24.
126. Judgment in Ledra, paras. 63, 66 and 67.
127. Ibid., paras. 63, 66, 67 and 68.
128. Judgment in Ledra, para 59.
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rule”.129 Whilst for the Court “the Commission’s inaction in breach of the
obligation to ensure, in the context of the adoption of the Memorandum of
Understanding, that the latter was in conformity with EU law”130 constitutes
unlawful conduct, the Advocate General considers it sufficient on the part of
the Commission “to deploy its best endeavours to prevent” a breach of EU law
by an MoU.131 The Advocate General understands the powers linked to the
Commission’s role as “Guardian of the Treaties” in Article 17(1) TEU as
discretionary powers. His reasoning builds on a comparison of these
discretionary powers to the power to act against Member States infringing EU
law under Articles 258, 260 TFEU. With a view to the latter there is indeed a
well-established case law, according to which the Commission has no
obligation to initiate infringement proceedings against Member States
although they are breaching EU law, so a failure to do so cannot trigger the
Union’s non-contractual liability.132
Yet, this comparison is less persuasive than appears at first sight. In the
context of the infringement procedure, the Commission is entrusted to defend
EU law that was already breached by Member States. This should be
distinguished from a situation in which the exercise of powers conferred upon
the Commission such as the negotiation and the signature of an MoU
contribute to a potential breach of EU law. Refusing to negotiate certain
conditions in the MoU or to sign the MoU on behalf of the ESM would prevent
such a breach coming into existence. In the first situation, the violation of EU
law was committed by a Member State without any involvement of the
Commission, whereas in the second situation the Commission would
contribute to the violation. It can therefore well be argued that, under Article
17(1) TEU, there is discretion regarding the pursuit of infringements
committed by other actors but there is a duty on the part of the Commission not
to contribute to any violation of EU law. This is precisely the position of the
Court.133 In sum, in the context of the adoption of MoU, a violation of a
fundamental right, as it is guaranteed by the Charter, by an MoU amounts to a
sufficiently serious breach of EU law by the Commission provided that the
violation cannot be justified.
Lastly, the issue of the damage that could be found to be too remote from the
unlawful conduct is to be addressed. This issue is of particular interest in the
129. Opinion in Ledra, para 80.
130. Judgment in Ledra, para 63.
131. Opinion in Ledra, para 70.
132. Case 247/87, Star Fruit, paras. 10–14; Case C-72/90, Asia Motor France v.
Commission, EU:C:1990:230, para 13; GC, Case T-202/02,Makedoniko Metro and Michaniki
v. Commission, EU:T:2004:5, paras. 42–47.
133. Interestingly, this is also the position of the A.G. in the Mallis case, in contrast to his
colleague in the Ledra case, cf. Opinion inMallis, para 82.
Joined Cases C-8-10/15 P, Joined Cases C-105-109/15 P 1153
Ledra case, as the “bail-in” took place before the formal adoption of the MoU.
The GC focused on the causal link, which it denied. Reading the Court’s
judgment setting aside the orders of the GC carefully reveals that the causal
link cannot be rejected that easily. It is true that the signature by the
Commission took place after the “bail-in”. The Court, however, did not
establish the unlawful conduct of the Commission on the basis of the signature
of the MoU, but on the basis of the Commission’s inaction in breach of the
obligation to ensure the conformity of the MoU with EU law. This obligation
applies to the Commission not only when signing the MoU but also when
negotiating it. Negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus by the Commission,
together with the ECB and the IMF, were initiated on 27 June 2012.
Whilst basing the unlawful conduct on a failure by the Commission allows
legally to establish a causal link with damages suffered before the formal
adoption of an MoU, it remains questionable whether this will help claimants
in practice. In the context of the action for damages, the burden of proof that
all conditions are fulfilled is on the claimants.134
7. Conclusions
Since the famous Marbury v. Madison case of the US Supreme Court135
landmark rulings of highest courts that establish long-lasting principles
limiting the powers of the defending public authorities were not favourable for
the claimants. The Ledra judgment appears to be a comparable landmark
decision with regard to the judicial protection against austerity measures in the
euro area. It closed the doors for individuals to the action for annulment
against MoUs and Eurogroup statements, but opened them to the action for
damages against the Commission. The Court thus bridged, unexpectedly, one
of the gaps in judicial protection against austerity measures at EU level.
Although it will pose a significant challenge for future claimants to convince
the Court that a violation of individual rights fails to meet the justification
test,136 the fact that the main negotiator of austerity measures is not shielded
134. Case C-100/07 P, É.R. and Others v. Council and Commission, EU:C:2007:585,
para 27.
135. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
136. In its first judgment after the Ledra case, the GC rejected claims for compensation in
Case T-531/14, Sotiropoudou and others v. Council, EU:T:2017:297 because of the broad
margin of appreciation the Council is supposed to have when adopting policy recommendations
under Article 126(7) TFEU and because of a justification of a potential violation of Charter
rights by the objective of achieving the budgetary health of the Member State in financial
distress (para 89).
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against any kind of judicial accountability will already lead to more carefully
negotiated policy reforms in future MoUs.
Yet, there are still gaps in the system of judicial protection. This refers most
notably to the fact that a successful action for damages does not affect the
validity of the supranational raison d’être of national austerity laws. Against
this background, the possibility to check macroeconomic adjustment
programmes that are adopted as Council decisions under Article 7 of
Regulation 472/2013 via the preliminary reference procedure becomes
crucial. The Union legislature introduced the instrument of macroeconomic
adjustment programmes in order to draw political commitments entered into
by Member States in financial distress in order to receive financial assistance
from the ESM into the EU legal framework. Whilst Article 7(2)(2) of
Regulation 472/2013 establishes an obligation on the part of the Commission
to ensure that MoUs signed on behalf of the ESM or of the EFSF are fully
consistent with macroeconomic adjustment programmes, the legal situation is
unclear as to the relationship between modifications of macroeconomic
adjustment programmes and MoUs that already entered into force. Since
MoUs define the conditions for financial assistance of the ESM and not the
macroeconomic adjustment programmes, a validity check of the latter by the
Court in a preliminary reference procedure is rendered practically
meaningless if a preliminary ruling does not also lead to a modification of
political commitments embodied in an MoU.
Future case law will show whether the ECJ is willing to continue along the
path set out in Ledra in filling the gaps in judicial protection against austerity
measures in the euro area.
René Repasi*
* Dr. René Repasi is postdoctoral researcher at the Erasmus School of Law, Rotterdam, and
Scientific Coordinator of the European Research Centre for Economic and Financial
Governance (EURO-CEFG).
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